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Abstract
In this note we provide a strategic implementation of the average tree solution for zero-
monotonic cycle-free graph games. That is, we propose a non-cooperative mechanism of which
the unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs correspond to the average hierarchical outcome
of the game. This mechanism takes into account that a player is only able to communicate
with other players (i.e., to make proposals about a division of the surplus of cooperation) when
they are connected in the graph.
Keywords: implementation, cycle-free graph game, tree game, hierarchical outcome,
average tree solution, weighted hierarchical outcome.
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1 Introduction
Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) provide a strategic implementation of the Shapley value
(Shapley, 1953) for zero-monotonic transferable utility (TU) games . That is, they propose a
non-cooperative extensive form game of which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE)
payoffs correspond to the Shapley value payoffs of the cooperative game. Following Pe´rez-
Castrillo and Wettstein (2001), several authors have suggested similar mechanisms for various
models and solutions.1
In this note we adapt the mechanism of Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) to obtain an
implementation of the average tree solution for zero-monotonic cycle-free graph games with
transferable utility. Cooperative TU-games with a (communication) graph structure, or graph
games , were introduced by Myerson (1977) and consist of a cooperative game with transferable
utility, or shortly TU-game, and a graph on the set of players in the game. The players in a
graph game are only able to cooperate (communicate) when they are connected in the graph.
A graph therefore provides a cooperation structure on the set of players in a TU-game, that
restricts their cooperation possibilities. Myerson (1977) also extended the Shapley value for
TU-games to the class of graph games. This value has become known as the Myerson value for
graph games.
A graph game is cycle-free if the graph does not contain any cycle. For this class of games
Herings, van der Laan, Talman (2008) proposed the average tree solution, which assigns to
every cycle-free graph game the average of all hierarchical outcomes, introduced in Demange
(2004).They provide an axiomatic characterization using the well-known component efficiency
and introducing component fairness (saying that deleting a link between two players yields for
both resulting components, that is the subgraphs remaining after deleting the link, the same
average change in payoff) as an alternative to fairness of the Myerson value (saying that deleting
a link between two players yields the same change in payoff for both players incident with the
link).
The goal of this note is to adapt the mechanism of Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001)
to implement the average hierarchical outcome for tree games, i.e. connected, cycle-free graph
games. Similar as in their paper, in the first stage of the mechanism developed here each player
makes a bid to all other players and the player with the highest net bid pays its bids. Then,
in the second stage this player makes a proposal on the division of the total payoff to all other
players. If all others accept, the game ends and each player gets the proposed amount. If the
proposal is rejected, the proposer leaves. Different from Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001),
1For example, efficient outcomes in a general social choice network in Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002);
the Owen value for games with coalition structures in Vidal-Puga and Bergantin˜os (2003); efficient outcomes
in local public goods environments in Mutuswami, Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2004); efficient networks in
Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2005); a Shapley-type outcome for games with externalities in Macho-Stadler,
Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2006); the position value, Myerson value and the component-wise egalitarian
value for games with graph structure in Slikker (2007); a generalized bidding approach for several values in Ju
and Wettstein (2009); and the egalitarian and discounted Shapley values in van den Brink and Funaki (2010)
and van den Brink, Funaki and Ju (2011).
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now the communication graph is taken into account and each of the neighbors of the original
proposer becomes a proposer and makes a proposal about the division of the total payoff to
the players in its component of the subgraph on the remaining players. If the proposal in a
particular component is accepted by all the players in the component, all these players get
the proposed amount and leave the mechanism. If the proposal in a particular component is
rejected, the proposer leaves and its neighbors become proposer in their own (sub)components.
This continues until either all players in all components have accepted their proposals or no
players are left.
What should be observed is that within a communication graph structure a player is only
able to communicate with other players when they are connected in the graph. This immediately
highlights a main difference between the mechanism in this note and that of Pe´rez-Castrillo and
Wettstein (2001), in that in their mechanism there is bidding on who will be the new proposer
each time a proposal is rejected, whereas in our mechanism, once a first proposer has been
established, the order in which the players are allowed to make proposals is fixed by the graph
structure. This also might result in multiple proposers when the graph on the remaining players
consists of several components. Nevertheless, the mechanism has similar desirable features as
the mechanism of Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001). Namely, (i) the players receive their
average hierarchical outcome in every SPE outcome, not only in expectation, (ii) there is no
a priori randomization that imposes an order on the moves of the players in the mechanism,
(iii) the mechanism is finite and (iv) the equilibrium strategies are simple, moreover they are
unique when the game is strictly zero-monotonic.
This note is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give some preliminaries on TU-games
and (communication) graph games. Before presenting our main result, in Section 3 we discuss
a mechanism that implements the marginal vectors of a TU-game (without graph) and give
a mechanism that implements the hierarchical outcomes of a tree game. These findings are
then used in Section 4 to present the main mechanism of this note that implements the average
hierarchical outcome on the class of zero-monotonic tree games.2
2 Communication graph games
A cooperative game with transferable utility, shortly a TU-game, is a pair (N, v), where N ⊂ IN
is a finite set of n = |N | players and v: 2N → R is a characteristic function on N such that
v(∅) = 0. A subset S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅, is called a coalition. For any coalition S, v(S) displays the
worth of that coalition, which can be interpreted as the wealth, measured in units of transferable
utility, that the members of coalition S are able to divide among themselves when they decide
to cooperate. The collection of all TU-games is denoted by G. For S ⊂ N , the TU-game (S, vS)
with vS given by vS(T ) = v(T ) for every T ⊆ S, is the subgame restricted to S. We sometimes
denote (S, vS) by (S, v). A TU-game (N, v) is zero-monotonic if v(S) + v({i}) ≤ v(S ∪ {i}) for
2Although stated for tree games for notational convenience, the implementations work for any cycle-free
graph game.
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every i ∈ N and S ⊆ N \ {i}. A payoff vector for (N, v) ∈ G is a vector x ∈ RN , assigning
a payoff xi to every i ∈ N . A (single-valued) solution or value on G is a function f on G
that assigns a payoff vector f(N, v) ∈ RN to every (N, v) ∈ G. An ordering on N ⊂ IN is
a one-to-one mapping pi:N → {1, . . . , n} assigning a rank number pi(k) ∈ {1, . . . , n} to every
player k ∈ N .3 We denote the collection of all orderings on N by Π(N). Given an ordering
pi ∈ Π(N), we define pii = {j ∈ N |pi(j) ≤ pi(i)} as the set of all players j with rank number pi(j)
at most equal to rank number pi(i) of player i, including i itself. For pi ∈ Π(N), the marginal
vector mpi(N, v) ∈ RN of TU-game (N, v) is given by mpii (N, v) = v(pii) − v(pii \ {i}), i ∈ N .
The Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) assigns to every (N, v) ∈ G the average of all |N |! marginal
(payoff) vectors mpi(N, v), pi ∈ Π(N).
A communication structure between players in a TU-game can be represented by an undi-
rected graph being a pair (N,L), where N is a finite set of nodes (in this note equal to the set
of players in a game) and L ⊆ {{i, j} | i 6= j, i, j ∈ N} is a set of edges or links (which stands
for the collection of communication links between the players). A sequence of k different nodes
(i1, . . . , ik) is called a path from i1 to ik in the graph (N,L) if {ih, ih+1} ∈ L for h = 1, . . . , k−1.
A coalition S ⊆ N is connected in (N,L) if for any i, j ∈ S, i 6= j, there is a path in S from i to
j. A coalition S is a component in (N,L) if it is a maximally connected set, i.e., S is connected
and S ∪ {j} is not connected for all j ∈ N \ S. Given (N,L), each K ⊆ N induces a subgraph
(K,L(K)), with L(K) = {{i, j} ∈ L | i, j ∈ K} the set of links on K. For K ⊆ N , CL(K)
denotes the collection of all components in (K,L(K)). A TU-game with (communication) graph
structure, shortly a graph game, is a triple (N, v, L), with (N, v) ∈ G a TU-game and (N,L) an
undirected graph. We denote the class of all graph games by GL. Myerson (1977) assumes that
in a graph game (N, v, L), a coalition S ⊆ N can only cooperate and realize its worth v(S) if
S is connected. Under this assumption, the (Myerson) restricted game (N, vL) ∈ G is defined
by vL(S) =
∑
K∈CL(S) v(K) for every S ⊆ N , thus the worth vL(S) is equal to the sum of the
worths of all components in (S, L(S)).The Myerson value assigns to every game (N, v, L) ∈ GL
the Shapley value of the restricted game (N, vL).
A path (i1, . . . , ik) is a cycle if {ik, i1} ∈ L. A graph (N,L) is cycle-free if it does not contain
a cycle. A graph (N,L) is connected if N is connected, and it is called a tree if it is cycle-free and
connected. A graph game (N, v, L) is a cycle-free graph game when (N,L) is cycle-free, and it
is a tree game when (N,L) is a tree. For tree games, Demange (2004) introduced the so-called
hierarchical outcomes. To define these outcomes, we first give the notion of a rooted tree. A
pair (N,D) is a directed graph or digraph with node set N if D ⊆ {(i, j) ∈ N ×N | i 6= j} is a
collection of directed edges or arcs . A sequence of different nodes (i1, . . . , ik) is a directed path
in (N,D) if (ih, ih+1) ∈ D for h = 1, . . . , k − 1. A directed graph (N,D) is a rooted tree if it
has precisely |N | − 1 arcs and there is a unique node i ∈ N , called the root, such that there
is directed path from i to every other node in (N,D). Given an undirected tree (N,L) and
a player i ∈ N , let (N,Li) be the unique rooted tree with root i induced by the tree (N,L),
i.e., Li = {(j, h)|{j, h} ∈ L, and j is on the path from i to h}. In the rooted tree (N,Li), if
3In many studies pi is called a permutation on N , which implicitly assumes that N = {1, . . . , n}. Since in
this paper the player set can vary we refer to pi as an ordering.
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(j, h) ∈ Li then node h is a successor, or follower, of j. We say that h is a subordinate of j if
there is a directed path from j to h. Given a tree (N,L) and a node i ∈ N , F ij denotes the set
of followers of j in (N,Li), and Sij the set containing j itself and all its subordinates in (N,L
i).
Notice that Sii = N and that every set S
i
j is connected in (N,L). Now, for a tree game (N, v, L)
and some i ∈ N , the hierarchical outcome hi(N, v, L) is the marginal vector mpi(N, vL) of the
(Myerson) restricted game for any ordering of the players that is consistent with the rooted
tree (N,Li), i.e., if the path from i to g in (N,L) contains j then pi(g) < pi(j). It follows that
hij(N, v, L) = v(S
i
j)−
∑
h∈F ij
v(Sih), j ∈ N.
For tree games, Herings et al. (2008) introduce the so-called average tree solution as the value
that assigns to every tree graph game the average of the |N | hierarchical outcomes hi(N, v, L),
i ∈ N .4 It thus assigns to every tree game (N, v, L) the average hierarchical outcome given by
AHO(N, v, L) =
1
|N |
∑
i∈N
hi(N, v, L).
The purpose of the underlying paper is to implement this solution.
3 An implementation of the hierarchical outcomes
In this section we propose a non-cooperative extensive form game, called a mechanism, of
which the unique SPE payoffs correspond to the payoffs in the hierarchical outcome hi(N, v, L),
i ∈ N , of any tree game (N, v, L) with (N, v) zero-monotonic. Since the hierarchical outcome
hi(N, v, L) is equal to the marginal vector of the restricted game (N, vL) for any ordering pi
that is consistent with the rooted tree (N,Li), we first discuss a mechanism that for any given
ordering pi ∈ Π(N) implements the marginal vector mpi(N, v) of any zero-monotonic TU-game.
For a given ordering pi on N , let ρ(k) = pi−1(n + 1 − k), k ∈ N , be the player in N with
rank number n+ 1− k in pi. Each round of the mechanism that implements mpi(N, v) consists
of three stages. In Stage 1 of round 1, player ρ(1) (with rank number n) is assigned to be the
proposer and makes a proposal about a division of v(N). So, player ρ(1) proposes a payoff to
every other player in N \ {ρ(1)}. In Stage 2 of round 1, the players in N \ {ρ(1)} sequentially
either accept or reject the proposal. If all these players accept, then in Stage 3 the players in
N \{ρ(1)} receive the proposed payoffs and ρ(1) receives the remaining. Otherwise, ρ(1) leaves
the mechanism and receives v({ρ(1)}), while the other players go to the next round to bargain
over their worth v(N \ {ρ(1)}). This second round has the same three stages as the first round
(but with n− 1 players), and starts with player ρ(2) (with rank number n− 1) as proposer. In
general, in round t ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} the mechanism proceeds with player ρ(t) as proposer, until
either at some round all remaining players accept the proposal or round n = |N | is reached in
4In fact, in Herings et al. (2008) the average tree solution is defined on the class of cycle free graph games
and the solution has been generalized to the class of all graph games in Herings, van der Laan, Talman and
Yang (2010).
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which only one player is left who just receives its singleton worth. Note that, different from the
mechanism in Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001), there is no bidding stage where the players
bid to decide who becomes the proposer in this mechanism, because this is fully determined by
the ordering pi.
The next theorem states that, given pi ∈ Π(N), the above mechanism implements the
marginal vector mpi(N, v) if the TU-game (N, v) is zero-monotonic. The proof of this theorem
is similar to part of the proof of the main theorem in Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) and
is therefore given in Appendix A, together with a formal description of the mechanism.
Theorem 3.1 Let (N, v) ∈ G be a zero-monotonic TU-game and let pi ∈ Π(N) be given. The
payoff vector in any SPE of the mechanism described above coincides with the payoff vector
mpi(N, v).
We now consider the tree game (N, v, L) and modify the above mechanism to state a mech-
anism, called Mechanism A, that implements for a given i ∈ N the hierarchical outcome
hi(N, v, L) in SPE. Given a player i ∈ N , in the first round of Mechanism A the root i in the
rooted tree (N,Li) is the proposer in Stage 1. If its proposal is accepted by all other players, the
mechanism ends immediately and each player j 6= i receives the proposed payoff while player i
receives the remainder. Otherwise, i leaves the mechanism with its stand-alone worth v({i}).
Observe that then for each of the followers j ∈ F ii , the set Sij (containing j and its subordinates
in (N,Li)) is a component in the subgraph (N \ {i}, L(N \ {i})) and is a directed subtree of
(N,Li) with player j as its root. If Sij = {j} then j also leaves the mechanism with its stand-
alone worth. If j has followers, then the set Sij advances to the next round of the mechanism.
In this next round the root j of the rooted subtree on Sij proposes a division of the worth v(S
i
j)
to its subordinates in Sij. If in some round a proposal of a player j to its subordinates in S
i
j is
accepted, then all players in Sij leave the mechanism with the proposed payoffs. If a proposal
is rejected, then the proposer leaves the mechanism with its stand-alone worth and each of its
followers becomes the root of the directed subtree on the set consisting of this follower and its
subordinates in (N,Li). If such a follower has no subordinates, it leaves the mechanism with
its stand-alone worth, otherwise it becomes the proposer to its subordinates in the next round.
Note that in this mechanism (i) in a round there can be multiple proposers, and (ii) in
a round there can be at the same time several branches in which the proposal is accepted,
and other branches in which the proposal is rejected. In a branch in which the proposal is
rejected the players, except the top of the branch, go to the next round and bargain in several
new subbranches. Since in each round at least one player leaves and the number of players
is finite, the mechanism ends within at most n − 1 rounds (if only two players are left, the
mechanism ends whether the proposal is accepted or not). Also note that, similar as in the
previous mechanism, there is no bidding stage to determine who is the proposer.
Mechanism A to implement the hierarchical outcome hi(N, v, L), i ∈ N , of a tree
game (N, v, L).
Initiation: Set P 1 = {i}, set t = 1 and go to Stage 1 of round 1.
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Stage 1: Every j ∈ P t proposes an offer yjk ∈ R to every subordinate k ∈ Sij \ {j}. Go to
Stage 2.
Stage 2: For every j ∈ P t, the subordinates k ∈ Sij \ {j} of player j sequentially either accept
or reject the offer yjk. If all subordinates accept, then the proposal of j is accepted;
otherwise the proposal of j is rejected. Go to Stage 3.
Stage 3: Consider every j ∈ P t. If the proposal of j is accepted, then each subordinate
k ∈ Sij \ {j} receives yjk, player j receives v(Sij)−
∑
k∈Sij\{j} y
j
k and the players in S
i
j (that
is j and all its subordinates) leave the mechanism. If the proposal of j is rejected, then
player j leaves the mechanism and obtains v({j}). Set Rt = {j ∈ P t | proposal of j is
rejected}, H t = ⋃j∈Rt F ij , and Ot = {j ∈ H t|F ij = ∅}. If j ∈ Ot, then j receives v({j})
and leaves the mechanism. Set P t+1 = H t \Ot as the set of proposers in the next round.
If P t+1 = ∅, no players are left and the mechanism stops. Otherwise, set t equal to t+ 1
and go to Stage 1 of the next round.
The next theorem states that, given i ∈ N , Mechanism A implements the hierarchical
outcome hi(N, v, L) if (N, v) is zero-monotonic. The proof follows from the fact that the
hierarchical outcome hi(N, v, L) is a marginal vectormpi(N, v) of the restricted game (N, vL) and
that Mechanism A is identical to the mechanism of Theorem 3.1 for every pi that is consistent
with (N,Li), except that in a round there can be multiple proposers.5 The proof is given in
Appendix B.
Theorem 3.2 Let (N, v, L) ∈ GL be a tree game with (N, v) zero-monotonic and let i ∈ N
be given. The payoff vector in any SPE of Mechanism A coincides with the payoff vector
hi(N, v, L).
4 Implementation of the average hierarchical outcome
In this section we use the results of Section 3 to present our main finding, namely a mechanism,
called Mechanism B, that implements the average hierarchical outcome of a tree game (N, v, L)
with (N, v) ∈ G zero-monotonic.6 Similar as in Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001), there
is a bidding procedure to decide who becomes the proposer, but only in the first round. In
the bidding procedure every player i ∈ N makes a bid bij to every other player j ∈ N \ {i},
which is the amount that player i will pay to each player j when i becomes the proposer.
The net bid of player i ∈ N is equal to Bi = ∑j∈N\{i} (bij − bji). The proposer is then chosen
with equal probability among the players that have the highest net bid. Since hjj(N, v, L) =
5This is similar as in Slikker (2007), in which the mechanism of Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) is
modified to implement the Myerson value of a graph game (N, v, L).
6For simplicity we only consider tree games, but the result holds for any zero-monotonic cycle-free graph
game if we let players bargain only within their own component.
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v(N)−∑k∈F jj v(Sjk) = vL(N)− vL(N \ {j}) it follows that
AHOj(N, v, L) =
1
|N |
(
vL(N)− vL(N \ {j}))+ 1|N | ∑
i∈N\{j}
hij(N, v, L). (4.1)
So, the average hierarchical outcome of a player j ∈ N is the average of its marginal contribution
to the grand coalition in the restricted game (N, vL) and its payoffs in the |N | − 1 hierarchical
outcome vectors hi(N, v, L), i 6= j. Although there are similarities between formula (4.1) and
the recursive formula of the Shapley value stated in Maschler and Owen (1989), formula (4.1) is
not recursive.7 Consequently, for a mechanism to implement the average hierarchical outcome
in SPE it is enough to have a single bidding procedure at the start of the mechanism. Using
formula (4.1) we will show that in any SPE of Mechanism B the bids of the players are given
by bij = AHOj(N, v, L)−hij(N, v, L), i, j ∈ N , i 6= j. The winner of the bidding procedure pays
its bids to the other players. Then the mechanism moves to the proposal procedure, which is
Mechanism A, with the winner of the bidding procedure as the proposer in the first round.
Mechanism B to implement the average hierarchical outcome AHO(N, v, L) of a tree
game (N, v, L).
Bidding Procedure: Each player j ∈ N makes bids bjk ∈ R to every k ∈ N \ {j}. For each
j ∈ N , let Bj = ∑k∈N\{j} (bjk − bkj ) be the net bid of player j. Select the player with the
highest net bid and call this player i. In case of a non-unique maximizer, choose any of
the bidders with the highest net bid to be player i with equal probability. The selected
player i is the winner of the bidding procedure and pays every other player j ∈ N \ {i}
its bid bij. So, each player j ∈ N \ {i} receives bij and player i receives −
∑
j∈N\{i} b
i
j at
this stage. Go to the Proposal Procedure.
Proposal Procedure: Play Mechanism A, starting in Stage 1 of round 1 with P 1 = {i}.
Hence, the winner i of the bidding procedure is the first proposer.
Notice that adding the bidding procedure to Mechanism A changes the final payoffs of the
players. The payoff of a player is now equal to the sum of its payoff in the bidding procedure
and its payoffs in the proposal procedure (Mechanism A). This gives the following total payoffs
when player i is the winner of the bidding procedure. When in round 1 the proposal of i is
accepted, its total payoff is v(N)−∑j 6=i (yij + bij), where yij is its offer to player j, j 6= i, in the
proposal procedure. In this case the players j 6= i receive yij+bij. When the proposal is rejected,
the payoff of i is v({i})−∑j 6=i bij. When in some round t > 1 the offers yjk of a player j 6= i to
its subordinates are accepted, then such a player j has final payoff bij + v(S
i
j) −
∑
k∈Sij\{j} y
j
k,
otherwise its payoff is bij + v({j}). When in some round all subordinates k of a proposer j
accept the offers yjk, then each subordinate k has final payoff b
i
k + y
j
k. When a proposal of a
7The recursive formula for the Shapley value Sh is given by Shj(N, v) =
1
|N | (v(N)− v(N \ {j})) +
1
|N |
∑
i∈N\{j} Shj(N \ {i}, vN\{i}), j ∈ N . Using this formula Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) prove
that the SPE bids in their mechanism are given by bij = Shj(N, v)− Shj(N \ {i}, vN\{i}), i, j ∈ N , i 6= j.
7
player j is rejected and for a follower k of j it holds that F ik = ∅, then the payoff to k is equal
to bik + v({k}).
Theorem 4.2 below states that Mechanism B implements the average hierarchical outcome
AHO(N, v, L) if the TU-game (N, v) is zero-monotonic and the graph (N,L) is a tree. To prove
the theorem we use, besides Theorem 3.2, the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1 Let (N, v, L) ∈ GL be a tree game with (N, v) zero-monotonic and, for each i, j ∈
N , j 6= i, let bij = AHOj(N, v, L)− hij(N, v, L). Then, for every i ∈ N ,
∑
j∈N\{i}
(
bij − bji
)
= 0.
Proof. For every i ∈ N we have that∑
j∈N\{i}
(
bij − bji
)
=
∑
j∈N\{i}
(
AHOj(N, v, L)− hij(N, v, L)− AHOi(N, v, L) + hji (N, v, L)
)
=
∑
j∈N\{i}
AHOj(N, v, L)− (n− 1)AHOi(N, v, L) +
∑
j∈N\{i}
(
hji (N, v, L)− hij(N, v, L)
)
=
∑
j∈N
AHOj(N, v, L)− nAHOi(N, v, L) +
∑
j∈N\{i}
(
hji (N, v, L)− hij(N, v, L)
)
= v(N)−
∑
j∈N
hji (N, v, L) +
∑
j∈N\{i}
(
hji (N, v, L)− hij(N, v, L)
)
= v(N)− hii(N, v, L)−
∑
j∈N\{i}
hij(N, v, L) = v(N)−
∑
j∈N
hij(N, v, L) = 0,
where the fourth equality follows by efficiency and the definition of the average hierarchical
outcome, and the last equality follows from efficiency of the hierarchical outcome. 2
Theorem 4.2 Let (N, v, L) ∈ GL be a tree game with (N, v) zero-monotonic. Then the
payoff vector in any SPE of Mechanism B coincides with the average hierarchical outcome
AHO(N, v, L).
Proof. (i) We first show that the payoff vector AHO(N, v, L) is indeed a SPE payoff vector
of the mechanism. Consider the following strategy of a player ` ∈ N in Mechanism B. In the
bidding procedure, player ` announces b`q = AHOq(N, v, L)− h`q(N, v, L) to every q ∈ N \ {`}.
When player i is the winner of the bidding procedure and j ∈ P t is a proposer in some
round t ≥ 1 of the proposal procedure, then j proposes in Stage 1 the hierarchical outcome
yjk = h
i
k(N, v, L) to every k in its set of subordinates S
i
j \ {j}. In Stage 2 every subordinate
k of a proposer j accepts any offer at least equal to hik(N, v, L) and rejects any offer strictly
smaller than hik(N, v, L).
Clearly, following these strategies the proposal procedure ends in round 1 with payoffs
hik(N, v, L), k ∈ N , when i is the winner of the bidding procedure. So, the total payoff to the
winner i in this strategy profile is equal to
hii(N, v, L)−
∑
j 6=i
bij = h
i
i(N, v, L)−
∑
j 6=i
(
AHOj(N, v, L)− hij(N, v, L)
)
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=
∑
j∈N
hij(N, v, L)−
∑
j 6=i
AHOj(N, v, L) = v(N)−
∑
j 6=i
AHOj(N, v, L) = AHOi(N, v, L),
where the third and fourth equality follow from efficiency of the hierarchical outcome. For
player j 6= i the total payoff is equal to
hij(N, v, L) + b
i
j = h
i
j(N, v, L) + AHOj(N, v, L)− hij(N, v, L) = AHOj(N, v, L).
Hence, the above strategy profile indeed result in the payoff vector AHO(N, v, L).
Next we show that these strategies are indeed SPE strategies. By Theorem 3.2 the strategy
profile is a SPE profile in the subgame that starts in Stage 1 of round 1 of the proposal procedure
(and all subsequent subgames). We therefore only have to consider the (sub)game that starts
in the bidding procedure of Mechanism B.
Suppose that every player i 6= k makes bids bij = AHOj(N, v, L)−hij(N, v, L), j ∈ N\{i}, and
that some player k deviates and makes bids (b
k
j )j∈N\{k} with b
k
j 6= AHOj(N, v, L)− hkj (N, v, L)
for at least one j 6= k. By Lemma 4.1 we know that in the strategy profile discussed above
the net bid Bi =
∑
j∈N\{i}(b
i
j − bji ) = 0 for every i ∈ N . When for the deviating player k
the corresponding net bid B
k
=
∑
j∈N\{k}(b
k
j − bjk) < Bk, it follows that some other player
i 6= k wins the bidding. Then i pays its bids bij in the bidding procedure and hi(N, v, L) in the
proposal procedure, so deviating does not change the payoffs. When B
k
= Bk, then there must
be a player i 6= k who wins the bidding, and again this does not change the payoff of player
k. Thus, we only have to consider the case that B
k
> 0 = Bk, i.e.
∑
j∈N\{k} b
k
j >
∑
j∈N\{k} b
k
j ,
and thus the deviating player k wins the bidding procedure. In the proposal procedure player k
makes offers hkj (N, v, L) (which are its SPE offers in the proposal subgame by Theorem 3.2), and
these offers are accepted. Hence k’s final payoff is v(N)−∑j∈N\{k} hkj (N, v, L)−∑j∈N\{k} bkj =
hkk(N, v, L) −
∑
j∈N\{k} b
k
j < h
k
k(N, v, L) −
∑
j∈N\{k} b
k
j = AHOk(N, v, L). This means that the
above strategy profile is indeed a SPE profile and it follows that AHO(N, v, L) is a SPE payoff
vector of Mechanism B.
(ii) It remains to prove that any SPE of Mechanism B yields the average hierarchical out-
come. Similar as in Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001), it follows that all net bids are zero
in any SPE (i.e. Bi = 0 for all i ∈ N) and, consequently, in any SPE each player’s payoff must
be the same, regardless of the winner of the bidding procedure.8
By Theorem 3.2, hk(N, v, L) is implemented in the proposal procedure when k wins the
bidding procedure. Now consider some player i. If i itself is the winner, then its final payoff
is xii = h
i
i(N, v, L) −
∑
j∈N\{i} b
i
j and when some player j 6= i is the winner i gets final payoff
xji = h
j
i (N, v, L) + b
j
i . Summing over all k ∈ N gives∑
k∈N
xki =
∑
k∈N
hki (N, v, L) +
∑
k∈N\{i}
(
bki − bik
)
= |N |AHOi(N, v, L)−Bi = |N |AHOi(N, v, L).
Since i is indifferent to the identity of the winner, it holds that xhi = x
k
i for all h, k ∈ N and
thus xji = AHOi(N, v, L) for all j ∈ N . 2
8This follows in the same way as Claims (c) and (d) in the proof of Theorem 1 in Pe´rez-Castrillo and
Wettstein (2001).
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Notice that, as in the implementation of the Shapley value of Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein
(2001), in any SPE of Mechanism B all net bids are equal and therefore the choice of a random
proposer is the outcome of the strategic bidding process. Further, it also holds that Mechanism
B has a unique SPE when the game (N, v) ∈ G is strictly zero-monotonic. In that case each
player k ∈ N makes bids bkj = AHOj(N, v, L) − hkj (N, v, L) to the players j ∈ N \ {k} in the
bidding procedure; some player i is randomly chosen to be the winner and becomes the proposer
in round 1 of the proposal procedure. This player proposes yij = h
i
j(N, v, L) to every player
j ∈ N \ {i} and every player j ∈ N \ {i} accepts the proposal.
In a similar way as Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) extend their implementation of the
Shapley value to weighted Shapley values, the result of Theorem 4.2 can easily be generalized
to obtain an implementation of the weighted hierarchical outcomes.9 Given a vector of weights
α ∈ RN+ with
∑
i∈N αi = 1, the weighted hierarchical outcome WHO
α on the class of tree games
is given by
WHOα(N, v, L) =
∑
i∈N
αih
i(N, v, L).
In particular, WHOα(N, v, L) = AHO(N, v, L) if αi =
1
|N | for all i ∈ N . Replacing the
bids bij in Mechanism B by αib
i
j, i, j ∈ N, j 6= i, yielding the weighted net bids Bjα =∑
k∈N\{j}(αjb
j
k − αkbkj ), results in a mechanism that implements in SPE the weighted hier-
archical outcome WHOα(N, v, L) of a tree game (N, v, L) with (N, v) ∈ G zero-monotonic. In
Appendix C we provide some further insight into this statement.
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Appendix A
To describe the mechanism that implements the marginal vector mpi(N, v) formally, let Nt =
N \ ∪t−1k=1ρ(k) = ∪nk=tρ(k) be the player set at the start of each round t, t = 1, . . . , n. Notice
that Nt+1 = Nt \ {ρ(t)}.
Mechanism to implement the marginal vector mpi(N, v) of a game (N, v).
Initiation: Let ρ(k) = pi−1(n+ 1− k), k ∈ N , set t = 1 and go to Stage 1 of round 1.
Stage 1: If t = n, the mechanism ends and player ρ(n) receives its stand-alone worth v({ρ(n)}).
If t < n, player ρ(t) proposes an offer y
ρ(t)
j ∈ R to every player j ∈ Nt+1. Go to Stage 2.
Stage 2: The players in Nt+1, sequentially (according to ρ), either accept or reject the offer.
If all players accept, then the proposal is accepted. If at least one player rejects, the
proposal is rejected. Go to Stage 3.
Stage 3: If the proposal is accepted, then each player j ∈ Nt+1 receives yρ(t)j , player ρ(t) obtains
the remainder v(Nt)−
∑
j∈Nt+1 y
ρ(t)
j of the payoff in this round and the mechanism ends.
If the proposal is rejected, then player ρ(t) leaves the mechanism and obtains its stand-
alone worth v({ρ(t)}). The players in Nt+1 go to the next round to bargain over v(Nt+1).
Set t equal to t+ 1 and return to Stage 1.
This mechanism leads to Theorem 3.1 of Section 3. To give a proof of this theorem we first
introduce some notation. Recall from Section 3 that for given ordering pi on N , ρ(k) = pi−1(n+
1 − k) is the player in N with rank number n + 1 − k in pi, k = 1, . . . , n, and that for
t = 1, . . . , n, Nt = {ρ(t), ..., ρ(n)} is the set of players at the start of round t of the mechanism.
For t = 1, . . . , n we further denote pit:Nt → {1, ..., n + 1 − t} as pit(k) = pi(k) for all k ∈ Nt,
piit = {j ∈ Nt | pit(j) ≤ pit(i)}, i ∈ Nt, and mpiti (Nt, vNt) = vNt(piit) − vNt(piit \ {i}), i ∈ Nt,
i.e., mpiti (Nt, vNt) is the marginal vector on the subgame (Nt, vNt) with respect to the ordering
pit. Notice that for i ∈ Nt, mpiti (Nt, vNt) = vNt(piit) − vNt(piit \ {i}) = v(piit) − v(piit \ {i}) =
v(pii)− v(pii \ {i}) = mpii (N, v), i.e., for every i ∈ Nt the payoff of i in mpit(Nt, vNt) is equal to
the payoff of i in the marginal vector mpi(N, v) on the game (N, v).
Proof of Theorem 3.1. (i) We first show that the marginal vector payoffs are indeed equi-
librium payoffs of the mechanism. Consider the strategies in which at any round t < n in
Stage 1 the proposer ρ(t) offers y
ρ(t)
j = m
pi
j (N, v) to every player j ∈ Nt \ {ρ(t)} and in Stage 2
the players j ∈ Nt \ {ρ(t)} accept any offer greater than or equal to mpij (N, v) and reject any
offer strictly smaller than mpij (N, v). These strategies constitute a SPE. Clearly, the strategy at
Stage 1 is a best response for the proposer as long as v(Nt)−
∑
j∈Nt\{ρ(t)}m
pi
j (N, v) ≥ v({ρ(t)}).
Since
∑
j∈Nt\{ρ(t)}m
pi
j (N, v) = v(Nt \ {ρ(t)}), this holds by definition of zero-monotonicity.
Also, at Stage 2 the strategy of every player j ∈ Nt \ {ρ(t)} is a best response as long as
mpij (N, v) = v(pi
j) − v(pij\{j}) ≥ v({j}), which again follows from the definition of zero-
monotonicity.
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(ii) Next we show by induction on the number of players that the payoffs in any SPE
outcome of the mechanism are equal to the marginal vector payoffs mpii (N, v), i ∈ N . For a
game (N, v) with |N | = n = 1 we have that in the first round t = 1 = n and so the single
player i ∈ N immediately receives its stand-alone worth v({i}), which is equal to its marginal
vector payoff mpii (N, v). Hence, any SPE yields the marginal vector m
pi(N, v).
Now, suppose that for every (Nk, vNk) with k ≥ t+ 1, (thus |Nk| = n+ 1− k ≤ n− t) and
given ordering pi, every SPE of the mechanism implements the marginal vector mpik(Nk, vNk).
We show that at Stage 2 of round t all players j ∈ N \ {ρ(t)} accept the offer if yρ(t)j >
mpij (N, v), while the proposal is rejected if y
ρ(t)
j < m
pi
j (N, v) for at least one j ∈ Nt \ {ρ(t)} =
Nt+1. In case of rejection, player ρ(t) leaves with its own worth and by the induction argument,
the payoff to a player j ∈ Nt+1 is mpit+1j (Nt+1, vNt+1) = mpij (N, v). If in Stage 2 of round t
the (last) player ρ(n) is reached, its optimal strategy is thus to accept any offer higher than
m
pit+1
ρ(n) (Nt+1, vNt+1) = m
pi
ρ(n)(N, v) and to reject any offer lower than m
pi
ρ(n)(N, v). The second
to last player ρ(n − 1) anticipates the reaction of player ρ(n). So, if yρ(t)ρ(n) > mpiρ(n)(N, v)
and in Stage 2 of round t player ρ(n − 1) is reached, then this player accepts the offer if
y
ρ(t)
ρ(n−1) > m
pit+1
ρ(n−1)(Nt+1, vNt+1) = m
pi
ρ(n−1)(N, v) and rejects the offer if y
ρ(t)
ρ(n−1) < m
pi
ρ(n−1)(N, v).
If y
ρ(t)
ρ(n) < m
pi
ρ(n)(N, v), then player ρ(n−1) is indifferent between accepting or rejecting any offer
y
ρ(t)
ρ(n−1), because player ρ(n) is going to reject the offer y
ρ(t)
ρ(n) anyway. By backwards induction it
follows that for every t = 1, . . . , n− 1 and every SPE, at Stage 2 of round t all players j ∈ Nt+1
accept the offer of player ρ(t) if y
ρ(t)
j > m
pi
j (N, v) and that the offer is rejected if y
ρ(t)
j < m
pi
j (N, v)
for at least one j ∈ Nt+1.
For a round t, we now consider two cases. First, if v(Nt) > v(Nt+1)+v({ρ(t)}), it follows that
the strategies described in the first part of the proof are the only SPE strategies in the subgame
that starts at Stage 1 of round t. To see this notice that in this case rejection of the proposal
made by player ρ(t) can not be part of a SPE because then player ρ(t) would receive v({ρ(t)}).
The proposer can improve its payoff by taking 0 <  < v(Nt)−v(Nt+1)−v({ρ(t)}) and offering
mpitj (Nt, vNt) +

|Nt|−1 > m
pi
j (N, v) to every j ∈ Nt+1. Hence, a SPE requires acceptance of the
offers in Stage 2. Since any proposal with y
ρ(t)
j < m
pi
j (N, v) for some j ∈ Nt+1 is rejected, a
SPE requires that y
ρ(t)
j ≥ mpij (N, v) for all j ∈ Nt+1. On the other hand, any proposal such
that y
ρ(t)
h > m
pi
h(N, v) for some h ∈ Nt+1 can not be part of a SPE, because then ρ(t) could
improve by taking 0 <  < y
ρ(t)
h −mpih(N, v) and offering mpij (N, v) + |Nt|−1 > mpij (N, v) to every
j ∈ Nt+1. It can be concluded that at any SPE in the subgame that starts in round t it must
hold that y
ρ(t)
j = m
pi
j (N, v) for all j ∈ Nt+1 and that these offers are accepted.
Second we consider the case that v(Nt) = v(Nt+1) + v({ρ(t)}) and thus mpiρ(t) = v(Nt) −
v(Nt+1) = v({ρ(t)}). As in the previous case, the strategies described in the first part of the
proof are SPE strategies in the subgame that starts at Stage 1 of round t. In addition, also
any strategy profile in which at Stage 1 of round t, player ρ(t) offers y
ρ(t)
j ≤ mpij (N, v) to some
players j ∈ Nt+1 and, at Stage 2, these players j reject any offer yρ(t)j ≤ mpij (N, v), constitutes
a SPE. In this SPE the proposer receives it own worth v({ρ(t)}).
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In both cases it follows that every player j ∈ Nt receives mpij (N, v) in every SPE of the
subgame that starts in round t. So, every SPE of the mechanism results in payoff vector
mpi(N, v). 2
Appendix B
Proof of Theorem 3.2. First, it follows straightforwardly that for every tree (N,L) the
restricted game (N, vL) is zero-monotonic if (N, v) is zero-monotonic. Second, as discussed in
Section 2, for given player i ∈ N , the hierarchical outcome hi(N, v, L) is equal to the marginal
vector mpi(N, vL) of the restricted game (N, vL) for every ordering pi that is consistent with the
rooted directed tree (N,Li). Notice that there can be multiple ordering pi ∈ Π(N) satisfying
these conditions, but that for every such pi it holds that hi(N, v, L) = mpi(N, vL). Further,
since every j 6= i is a subordinate of i we have that for every such pi it holds that pi(i) = n.
According to Mechanism A, i is the proposer in the first round.
To show that the payoffs in the hierarchical outcome hi(N, v, L) are indeed the payoffs of
Mechanism A in every SPE, consider the following strategies. In every round t ≥ 1, every
proposer j ∈ P t proposes in Stage 1 the hierarchical outcome payoff yjk = hik(N, v, L) to every
k in its set of subordinates Sij \ {j}. In Stage 2 every subordinate k of a proposer j accepts any
offer at least equal to hik(N, v, L) and rejects any offer strictly smaller than h
i
k(N, v, L). Clearly,
under these strategies the mechanism ends in round 1 and every player k ∈ N receives payoff
hik(N, v, L), being the payoff of the marginal vector m
pi(N, vL) for an ordering pi consistent with
(N,Li). The proof that these strategies form an SPE follows from Theorem 3.1. In fact, let Nt
be the set of players in round t. Then the subgraph (Nt, L(Nt)) consists of several components,
but on each of these components the rooted tree (N,Li) induces a rooted subtree. Then in round
t on each component the root proposes the hierarchical outcome to each of its subordinates, and
these payoffs are equal to the payoffs of these players in every marginal vector mpi(N, vL) with
pi consistent with (N,Li). So, Mechanism A is identical to the mechanism of Theorem 3.1 for
every pi consistent with (N,Li), except that in a round t there might be multiple proposers, each
proposing the hierarchical outcome on its own subtree. Because the mechanism of Theorem 3.1
on a zero-monotonic game (N, v) with initiation pi implements the marginal vector mpi(N, v)
in SPE, it follows that Mechanism A with initiation i implements in SPE the marginal vector
mpi(N, vL) for every pi consistent with (N,Li), i.e. hi(N, v, L). 2
Appendix C
In Section 4 it is stated that given a vector of weights α ∈ RN+ with
∑
i∈N αi = 1, there exists
a mechanism that implements in SPE the weighted hierarchical outcome WHOα(N, v, L) of a
tree game (N, v, L) with (N, v) ∈ G zero-monotonic.
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Mechanism C to implement the weighted hierarchical outcome WHOα(N, v, L) of a
tree game (N, v, L). This mechanism is the same as Mechanism B, except that the net bid
Bj, j ∈ N , is replaced by the weighted net bid Bjα =
∑
k∈N\{j}(αjb
j
k − αkbkj ).
Lemma 4.1 of Section 4 now changes to the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3 Let (N, v, L) ∈ GL be a tree game with (N, v) zero-monotonic. Given the vector
of weights α ∈ RN+ with
∑
i∈N αi = 1, let b
i
j = WHO
α
j (N, v, L) − hij(N, v,L). Then, for every
i ∈ N , Biα = 0.
Proof. For every i ∈ N we have that
Biα =
∑
j∈N\{i}
(
αiWHO
α
j (N, v, L)− αihij(N, v, L)− αjWHOαi (N, v, L) + αjhji (N, v, L)
)
= αi
∑
j∈N\{i}
WHOαj (N, v, L)− (1− αi)WHOαi (N, v, L) +
∑
j∈N\{i}
(
αjh
j
i (N, v, L)− αihij(N, v, L)
)
= αi
∑
j∈N
WHOαj (N, v, L)−WHOαi (N, v, L) +
∑
j∈N\{i}
(
αjh
j
i (N, v, L)− αihij(N, v, L)
)
= αiv(N)−
∑
k∈N
αkh
k
i (N, v, L) +
∑
j∈N\{i}
(
αjh
j
i (N, v, L)− αihij(N, v, L)
)
= αiv(N)− αi
∑
k∈N
hik(N, v, L) = 0,
where the second equality follows from the fact that αi +
∑
j∈N\{i} αj = 1, the fourth from
efficiency of the weighted hierarchical outcomes and the last from efficiency of the hierarchical
outcomes. 2
With the help of this lemma the proof of the next theorem follows in the same way as the
proof of Theorem 4.2 and is therefore omitted.
Theorem 4.4 Let (N, v, L) ∈ GL be a tree game with (N, v) zero-monotonic and let α ∈ RN+
with
∑
i∈N αi = 1 be a vector of weights. Then the payoff vector in any SPE of Mechanism C
coincides with the payoff vector WHOα(N, v, L).
It holds that Mechanism C has a unique SPE when (N, v) ∈ G is strictly zero-monotonic.
In that case each player k ∈ N makes bids bkj = WHOαj (N, v, L) − hkj (N, v, L) to the players
j ∈ N \ {k} in the bidding procedure; some player i is randomly chosen to be the winner and
so is the proposer in round 1 of the proposal procedure. This player offers yij = h
i
j(N, v, L) to
every player j ∈ N \ {i} and every player j ∈ N \ {i} accepts the offer.
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